Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 72

Issue 2

Article 16

2021

Peter Gerhart on Good Faith: Following a Trail of Breadcrumbs
James Gordley

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James Gordley, Peter Gerhart on Good Faith: Following a Trail of Breadcrumbs, 72 Case W. Res. L. Rsrv.
317 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol72/iss2/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 2·2021

Peter Gerhart on Good
Faith: Following a Trail of
Breadcrumbs
James Gordley†
Contents
Introduction .................................................................................. 317
I. Peter Gerhart’s Approach......................................................... 318
A. Preserving Equilibrium .................................................................. 318
B. Acting in Good Faith ..................................................................... 324
1. Providing Flexibility ....................................................................... 325
a. Discretion To Be Exercised According to a Standard ............... 325
b. Discretion That is Not Subject to a Standard .......................... 330
2. Promoting Cooperation ................................................................... 335
a. Positive Duties of Cooperation .................................................. 336
b. Negative Duties of Cooperation ................................................ 337
II. Other Conceptions of Good Faith ........................................... 341
A. Good Faith as an “Excluder” .......................................................... 342
B. The Good Faith as a Violation of Fundamental Principles of
Interpretation ............................................................................. 346
C. Good Faith as a Recapitulation of Fundamental Principles of
Interpretation ............................................................................. 347
D. Good Faith as Altruism ................................................................. 348
E. Good Faith as Means of Promoting an Efficient Result ..................... 351
Conclusion: Good Faith and Fair Exchange ................................. 354

Introduction
Virtually every state recognizes that the parties to a contract are
under a duty to act in good faith. According to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts: “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”1
Scholars who have tried to explain that duty have become lost in a
forest of difficulties. In Part II of this Article, we will see why. Peter
Gerhart discussed the duty briefly in seven pages of Contract Law and
Social Morality,2 a book published shortly before his death. In Part I
we will see how, if we follow the clues he left in these few pages, like
the proverbial trail of breadcrumbs, they will lead us through the forest.
†

W.R. Irby Distinguished University Professor, Tulane Law School.

1.

Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 205 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).

2.

Peter M. Gerhart, Contract Law and Social Morality 136–43
(2021) [hereinafter Gerhart, Contract Law].
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I. Peter Gerhart’s Approach
A.

Preserving Equilibrium

In Gerhart’s view, the duty to act in good faith followed from a
larger principle: that of preserving the “ex ante equilibrium” of an
exchange:
It is hard to imagine the institution of contracting without a
concept like good faith. When applied to performance obligations,
the basic concept is straightforward: because contracts leave so
many performance questions unaddressed, each party must
interpret its performance obligations using a method of reasoning
that appreciates the best way of maintaining the ex ante
equilibrium position of the parties . . . . Both parties agree on,
and thus maintain, the performance obligations that [the] ex ante
equilibrium bargain maintained. The concept of good faith
interpretation, as implemented here, tells the parties what they
must do to align their interpretations with the equilibrium the
parties achieved through bargaining.3

According to Gerhart, then: (1) there is an ex ante equilibrium in
a contract of exchange, (2) which the parties achieved through
bargaining and wish to preserve, (3) and a method of reasoning for
deciding which terms will preserve it even though these terms were not
expressly addressed in their contract.
I have defended propositions like these elsewhere. I believe my
understanding of them may be, in relevant respects, like that of
Gerhart. He said, at least, that he was following “the path suggested
by James Gordley,”4 which gives me too much credit. As he noted,
“[t]he idea presented here has many ancestors.”5 Moreover, by extending the path, he showed how to explain the duty to act in good faith.
As a first step in understanding his explanation, I will summarize how
I understand the propositions on which it rests.
First, there is an ex ante equilibrium in a contract of exchange.
This idea has many ancestors. As I have described elsewhere, the idea
of equality in exchange can be traced from Aristotle through medieval
philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, through the so-called “late
scholastic jurists” of the 16th and 17th century, such as Domenico Soto,
Luis de Molina, and Leonard Lessius, to the natural law writers of the
17th and 18th century, such as Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and

3.

Id. at 137.

4.

Id. at 6 n.9 (citing James Gordley, Contract Law in the Aristotelian
Tradition, in The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays 265, 268
(Peter Benson ed., 2001)).

5.

Id.
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those they influenced, such as Robert Pothier.6 It was only rejected
confidently with the rise of the will theories of contract of the 19th
century.7 In speaking of “equilibrium,” I believe that Gerhart endorsed
a modern version of this traditional idea.
The traditional idea is that a fair exchange is one in which the
performance that each party is to make is equivalent in economic value
to the one that he is to receive.8 Proponents of this idea understood
that each party personally puts a higher value on what he is to receive
than what he is to give in return. Otherwise, the parties would not
exchange. Nevertheless, the economic value of each party’s assets
remained the same, and in that sense the value of the performances was
equal. At the time of the transaction, neither party became richer or
poorer. He would thereafter if the value of the goods or service he had
exchanged rose or fell. But that risk was considered to be inherent in
the decision to buy or sell, and it fell upon each of the parties. Soto
said, “as the business of buying and selling is subject to fortuitous
events of many kinds, merchants ought to bear risks at their own
expense, and on the other hand, they may wait for good fortune.”9
According to Lessius, “as they may gain if they receive goods at small
expense, so they may lose if the expense was disproportionate or
extraordinary.”10 Each party was compensated for taking the risk that
he would lose later on by the chance that he would gain.11
A corollary was that the other terms of the contract should preserve
equality. If the seller does not warrant his goods against defects, the
unwary buyer will pay a sound price for an unsound commodity. The
seller can waive the warranty but only if he reduces the price to reflect
the risk that the goods are defective.12 The exchange is equal as long as
each party is compensated for the risks that he assumed. In Gerhart’s
words, the contract is in equilibrium ex ante.13 Ex post, there will be
winners and losers. Ex ante, the contract is fair in the same sense as a
fair bet.

6.

See, e.g., James Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern
Contract Doctrine 94–102 (1991).

7.

Id. at 201–08.

8.

James Gordley & Hao Jiang, Contract as Voluntary Commutative Justice,
2020 Mich. St. L. Rev. 725, 741 (2020).

9.

Domenicus Soto, De iustitia et iure libri decem lib. 6 q. 2 a. 3 (1553).

10.

Leonardus Lessius, De iustitia et iure, ceterisque virtutibus
cardinalis libri quatuor lib. 2, cap. 21, dub. 4 (1628).

11.

See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1587, 1610–
11 (1981).

12.

3 Ludovicus Molina, De iustitia et iure tractatus III, disp. 353
(1614).

13.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 60–62.
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The second proposition is that the parties arrive at this equilibrium
through their own negotiations or bargaining. I understand this
proposition to mean that they will do so even if neither of them gave a
thought to fairness. Gerhart may not. He believes equilibrium is
produced by “other-regarding or values-balancing reasoning” in which
each party “appreciate[s] both parties’ private projects but d[oes] not
know which private project would be favored by the reconciliation of
values.” 14 “The other-regarding person does this by means of the
thought process behind the veil of ignorance, a thought process that
ensures that the appraisal of conflicting values is neutral . . . .” 15
“[T]he veil of ignorance [i]s the core concept that other-regarding
persons will undertake when they have made promises.”16
He took the idea of the veil of ignorance from John Rawls. In
Rawls’s theory of justice, a list of liberties to belong to each citizen is
drawn up by their hypothetical representatives behind a “veil of
ignorance,” which prevents them from knowing what purposes the
members that they represent wish to pursue.17 I believe that Rawls’s
use of the “veil of ignorance” to explain justice is an illusion, but,
nevertheless, Gerhart’s use of it to explain equilibrium or equality in
exchange is not. Rawls presupposes too much and too little of those
who make decisions behind the veil of ignorance: too much, because he
supposes that they represent people who have a “conception of the
good” 18 without explaining what would make it “good” except that
people in some way prefer it;19 too little, because he supposes that they
can make decisions about what form of government is best without
regard to the context, culture, and characteristics of the people to be
governed. 20 Even John Locke, who thought that government was
formed by the people, believed that the people might choose to institute
a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy.21
If, however, we imagine the contracting parties making decisions
behind a veil of ignorance, we arrive at much the same idea of equality
in exchange as the one just described. Equality or equilibrium means
that neither party can tell in advance whether he is more likely to win
14.

Id. at 68.

15.

Id.

16.

Id. at 65.

17.

John Rawls, Political Liberalism 24–25 n.27 (1993).

18.

Id. at 18–19.

19.

See James Gordley, The Just Price: The Aristotelian Tradition and John
Rawls, 11 Eur. Rev. of Cont. L. 197, 215 (2015); James Gordley,
The Eclipse of Classical Thought in China and the West, 309–
19 (forthcoming 2022).

20.

See Gordley, supra note 19, at 213; Gordley, supra note 19, at ch. 13.

21.

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 372 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960).
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or lose, much like gamblers who have made a fair bet. Gerhart
recognized that “[p]arties implicitly bargain over the allocation of
various risks. For any risk, we can presume that the parties allocate the
risk to the low cost risk avoider . . . .”22 Behind the veil of ignorance,
presumably, the parties will agree that whichever party assumes that
risk will be compensated for doing so. And so we arrive at the idea of
equality in exchange presented earlier.
A difference, however, is that Gerhart, like Rawls, uses the
metaphor of the veil of ignorance to determine what a person should
do. That person’s motivation for doing it, according to Rawls, is that
he has “a capacity for a sense of justice,”23 and for Gerhart, is that he
is an “other-regarding person.”24 Actual contracts are made by parties
who are not behind a veil of ignorance. Unless we assume that they are
high-minded, they will pursue their private interests. If they arrive at
a fair result, an “equilibrium,” then we must explain how self-interested
parties are able to do so. If they will not, then parties behind a veil of
ignorance will be unable to supply terms that maintain an equilibrium
that never was.
In my view, to quote Adam Smith: each person “intends only his
own gain,” and yet “he is . . . led by an invisible hand to promote an
end which was no part of his intention.” 25 The end of which I am
speaking, however, might have surprised Adam Smith. It is to make a
contract on terms that are fair to the other party.
We can see why if we consider how the traditional idea was once
understood. Its proponents assumed that the exchange is made in a
competitive market. Consequently, the terms on which each party
contracts will be as good or better than the terms on which others are
trading. The price that preserves equality will be the market price.26
That price represents traders’ estimate of what we would call the
expected value of the goods exchanged. This understanding of equality
is like that of proponents of the traditional idea. They called this
estimate the “common judgement” or communis aestimatio. 27 The
concept of expected value may seem modern, but proponents of the
traditional idea invented it.28

22.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 173.

23.

Rawls, supra note 17, at 19.

24.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 68.

25.

2 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations 258 (1776).

26.

Gordley, supra note 6, at 97.

27.

Gordley, supra note 6, at 97.

28.

Molina, supra note 12, at disp. 736; James Franklin, The Science of
Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal 286–88
(2015) (citing Soto and Lessius on wagers and insurance).
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The corollary, as we have seen, is that the other terms of the
contract preserve equality. The seller can waive a warranty, but only if
he reduces the price to reflect the risk that the goods are defective.29
The exchange is equal as long as each party is compensated for the risks
he is to bear. Again, there is no need to assume that a party will reduce
his price because he is high-minded enough to be concerned about
fairness. The other party will not contract with him unless he offers
terms as good as those on which others are trading. If he does not offer
a reduced price, the other party will contract with someone else.
Nevertheless, proponents of the traditional idea had little to say
about why a party is deemed to warrant his goods against defects unless
the contract provides otherwise, or why he might wish to waive the
warranty and reduce the price. This brings us to the third proposition:
there is a method of reasoning deciding which terms best preserve the
ex ante equilibrium, even though they are not expressly mentioned in
the contract. The method, according to Gerhart, is “values-balancing
reasoning.”30 One must ask: do the “benefits” of such a term to one
party “impose an unequal and therefore impermissible burden on the
counterparty, given the benefits she has promised to deliver in the
exchange?”31 How do the “costs” that it saves by one party compare
with the “burdens” it “would place on the counterparty’s . . .
interests”?32
I believe this approach is compatible with the one that Hao Jiang
and I described in a recent article.33 Equality is preserved when each
party is compensated for the risks that he assumes. Economists explain
that if the parties contemplate a risk in advance, they will assign it to
the party who can bear it at the lowest cost and adjust the price to
compensate him for doing so. They will not assign a risk to the party
who can bear it at a higher cost and compensate him. Rather than do
so, the party who can bear the risk at the lowest cost would choose to
bear it himself. Economists conclude that this assignment of risk would
be efficient ex ante.34 As we have seen, it is also fair, although economists concern themselves with efficiency, not fairness.35
Economists also explain when one party can bear a risk at a lower
cost than another. It depends on three factors. One is who can best

29.

See Molina, supra note 12, at disp. 353.

30.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 63.

31.

Id. at 138.

32.

Id.

33.

Gordley & Jiang, supra note 8, at 725.

34.

Id. at 738–39.

35.

See supra text accompanying notes 8–11.
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foresee the magnitude of the risk.36 A risk is lower for the party who
can best foresee it for roughly the same reason that the risk of playing
poker is lower for someone who can peek at the other players’ cards.
Another factor is who can best control the risk.37 If the party who can
do so must bear the cost if the risk eventuates, then the further risk is
eliminated that he may omit the precautions he ought to take to control
it. A third factor is who can best spread the risk over similar
transactions, whether by buying insurance or by self-insuring.38 The risk
of a house catching fire is less for an insurance company than for a
homeowner because it can spread that risk over the many houses it
insures. The risk of a streak of bad luck is less for a casino than for an
individual gambler.
These factors explain why, if the parties contemplate a risk in
advance, they will place it on the party who can bear it at the lowest
cost and then compensate him. As we have seen, that result is fair in
that it preserves equality in the values exchanged. These factors also
explain why, if the parties did not contemplate a risk in advance, to
place it on the party who can bear it most easily would best preserve
equality in the values exchanged. Even if that party had not been
compensated for bearing that risk, there will be less disruption of the
equality of the exchange than if it is placed where it would cause a
smaller loss. More importantly, the party who can bear the risk at the
lowest cost would likely have been compensated for doing so by an
adjustment in the contract price even if, when the contract was drafted,
the parties did not have that specific risk in mind. The party who can
best foresee the risk may have taken it into account along with all the
other risks he could foresee in setting his prices, although he did not
contemplate them all when the contract was drafted. If he incurs costs
to control that risk, they will be reflected in the contract price along
with all the other costs he incurs—although, again, when the contract
is drafted he may not be thinking of any one of them. In the course of
his business, a party may encounter the same risk repeatedly in other
contracts. For that reason, he may, in effect, insure the other party
against its consequences by raising his price and assuming the risk. He
will do so when setting his prices for the entire range of contracts in
which such a risk may arise. His contract with a single party may not
contain a term that mentions that risk.
Consequently, when a risk is not expressly assigned by a contract,
a court should place it on the party that can bear it at the lowest cost.
To determine which party can do so, it might consider the factors just
36.

Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Stud.
83, 91–92 (1977).

37.

Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic
Analysis 135 (1970).

38.

Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 36, at 91.
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mentioned and ask which party can best foresee and control the risk or
will encounter it repeatedly in other transactions. A more reliable
method is to see how the parties expressly assigned risks ex ante. The
parties would have chosen to place these risks on the one who can bear
them most cheaply. If the risk in question is like one that was expressly
assigned, it should be placed on the same party.
B. Acting in Good Faith

Gerhart is right that the duty of good faith comes into play when
“contracts leave . . . performance questions unaddressed.”39 Recognizing that duty, however, is different, in one respect, from most situations
in which a court reads terms into a contract to resolve such questions.
Usually, the parties could have addressed the question in advance and
inserted a term in the contract to resolve it. In contrast, the most puzzling applications of the doctrine of good faith are in situations in which
the parties could not have done so.
In one situation, as Gerhart observed, the duty to act in good faith
“accommodates the need for . . . flexibility . . . .”40 It may be better
not to prescribe everything a party must do or not do in advance.
Sometimes the parties can achieve flexibility in a way that does not
raise issues of good faith. For example, they provide that a term of their
agreement, such as an increase in price, depends on a standard that can
be applied mechanically, such as the Consumer Price Index. Instead,
they might entrust the decision as to what a term will be to the discretion of one of the parties. That discretion must be exercised in good
faith.
In another situation, the duty to act in good faith is needed to
promote cooperation by the parties after the contract is made so that
each party can receive the benefits for which he contracted. It may be
impossible to set out in advance all the things that each party should
or should not do.
Neither problem could be solved even if drafting a contract were
costless and drafters more astute. It is sometimes thought, as Robert
Scott has noted, that “[i]n a world where Coasian assumptions of zero
transactions costs hold, the choice among gap-filling default rules is
irrelevant because parties can and will negotiate around suboptimal
legal rules.”41 It may not be so for the two reasons just described.
Gerhart gave two examples of how to determine whether a party is
acting in good faith. They both concern the first situation: in order to
make the contract more flexible, discretion is given to one of the

39.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 137.

40.

Id. at 137–38.

41.

Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 847, 850 (2000).
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parties. 42 We will consider his examples and their implications for
similar cases. We will then see how his approach can be extended to
the second situation: the parties need to cooperate in good faith so that
each may obtain the benefits for which he contracted.
1. Providing Flexibility

There are two ways to make a commitment more flexible by
conferring discretion on one of the parties. That party might be required
to use his discretion according to a standard which is not to be applied
mechanically but according to his best judgment. An example is an
output or requirements contract in which one party is to buy or sell
what the other party supplies or orders. The standard is that the
amount supplied or ordered is to be the amount that the party produces
or needs. That is Gerhart’s first example of a duty to act in good faith.43
Alternatively, the contract may allow a party to use his discretion
without regard to any such standard. An example is an option, which
a party is free to exercise or not. That is Gerhart’s second example.44
He implicitly recognized that there is a difference between these two
situations.
a. Discretion to Be Exercised According to a Standard

We will follow the trail that Gerhart laid out in these examples.
Appropriately enough, it begins with a case about breadcrumbs. In Feld
v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc.,45 the defendant agreed to sell all the
breadcrumbs it produced.46 The contract could be terminated on six
months’ notice.47 When the seller found it “uneconomical” to produce
breadcrumbs and the buyer refused to pay a penny per pound more
than the contract price, the seller shut down production and sold the
raw material to an animal feed producer.48 Gerhart said, correctly, that
to decide whether the seller acted in good faith, we must “determine
the plausibility of any assertion that the seller lowered the price of the
breadcrumbs in order to buy the freedom to terminate the contract
without notice.”49
That assertion is not plausible. In the sale of a definite quantity of
goods yet to be produced at a fixed price, the seller assumes two risks.
One is that he could have sold the goods to someone else if he had
42.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 139–43.

43.

Id. at 139.

44.

Id. at 141.

45.

335 N.E.2d 320 (N.Y. 1975).

46.

Id. at 321.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 141.
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waited. The other is that the goods will cost him more to produce than
he estimated. If he did not wish to assume the second of these risks, he
would contract to be paid cost-plus rather than at a fixed price. In
return, the buyer assumes the corresponding risks: that had he waited
he could have bought the goods for less from someone else, and if he
contracted for the goods cost-plus, the cost of producing them would
have been lower than estimated. In Feld, the seller tried to escape the
risk that a party normally assumes when he sells at a fixed price, a risk
which the seller had been compensated to bear. The court held that
whether the seller acted in good faith was a factual question to be
resolved at trial.50 According to Gerhart, the seller could escape liability
if he can show that he lowered his price “in order to buy the freedom
to terminate the contract without notice.” 51 Certainly, but for the
reason just explained, it is unlikely that he did. If so, Gerhart said, “the
seller is likely to have evidence to that effect available.”52 That evidence
would have to be convincing indeed.
In an output or requirements contract, unlike an option, the seller
or buyer must exercise his discretion according to a standard. That
requirement predates the Uniform Commercial Code.53 According to the
UCC, the quantity supplied or ordered must be “such actual output or
requirements as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity
unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence
of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output
or requirements may be tendered or demanded.”54
In an output or requirements contract, however, all that is necessary is that there be a standard. A party may be acting in good faith
even if the amount he supplies or orders is not proportionate to a stated
estimate or to his normal output or requirements.
In Feld, the defendant agreed to sell all the breadcrumbs it
produced.55 As the court noted, breadcrumbs are “a manufactured item,
starting with stale or imperfectly appearing loaves and followed by
removal of labels, processing through two grinders, the second of which
effects a finer granulation, insertion into a drum in an oven for toasting
and, finally, bagging of the finished product.”56 Consequently, the standard was not the seller’s “normal or . . . prior output” but the number
of stale and imperfect loaves available to produce them.
50.

335 N.E.2d at 323.

51.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 141.

52.

Id.

53.

See, e.g., Brawley v. United States, 96 U.S. 168, 172 (1877); N.Y. Cent.
Ironworks Co. v. U.S. Radiator Co., 66 N.E. 967, 968 (N.Y. 1903).

54.

U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (Am. L. Inst. & Unif. L. Comm’n 2020).

55.

335 N.E.2d at 321.

56.

Id.
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In New York Central Ironworks Co. v. United States Radiator Co.,57
the court upheld the contract even though the most the buyer had ever
required before was “48,000 feet of radiation,” and it now required
100,000 feet.58 “After the execution of the contract there was a large
advance” in the price of radiation.59 There was no evidence, however,
that the buyer increased the quantity he purchased, not because his
needs increased, but to take advantage of the rise in prices.60 That was
so, even though the buyer may have needed more because the price of
his own product had risen and so it became advantageous to him to
produce more.61 He profited from a change in the market price, but he
was not ordering more simply because the market price had changed.62
Moreover, a party may act in good faith even though his output or
needs are disproportionate to a “stated estimate.”63 In the early case of
Brawley v. United States,64 the plaintiff agreed to supply Fort Pembina
in Dakota Territory with 880 cords of oak wood “more or less, as shall
be determined to be necessary, by the post-commander.”65 The postcommander determined that only 40 cords were needed.66 The court
held that as 880 was “only . . . an estimate of the probable amount,”
the army could take only 40.67 “[S]o long as [it] act[ed] in good faith,”
in both making the estimate and in determining how many cords were
needed, the buyer could take only what it needed.68
In output and requirements contracts, the parties leave the
quantity term open. They may do so with the price term. A party may
be allowed to decide on the price according to some standard which,
again, cannot be applied mechanically. As before, a party acts in bad
faith if he deviates from that standard. As before, to determine if he
has done so, one must identify the risks the parties wished to allocate
when they gave him this discretion.

57.

66 N.E. 967 (N.Y. 1903).

58.

Id. at 967–68.

59.

Id. at 968.

60.

Id. at 967–68.

61.

Id. at 968.

62.

Id. at 967–68.

63.

U.C.C. § 2-306 (Am. L. Inst. & Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif.
State L. 2020).

64.

96 U.S. 168 (1878).

65.

Id. at 169.

66.

Id.

67.

Id. at 171.

68.

Id. at 172.
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Neither the standard nor the duty needs to be set out in the
contract. In Best v. United States National Bank of Oregon,69 depositor
claimed that a bank had abused its authority to set fees for checks
drawn on nonsufficient funds (NSF fees) by charging far more than its
costs plus a reasonable profit.70 According to the court, the Bank did
not act in good faith if the depositors “reasonably expected that the
Bank’s NSF fees would be priced . . . to cover the Bank’s NSF check
processing costs plus an allowance for overhead costs plus the Bank’s
ordinary profit margin on checking account services.”71
There is an ongoing controversy as to whether the duty to act in
good faith can be violated only by one who acts dishonestly. 72 As
Summers said, “[m]any theorists have been tempted to try to conceptualize . . . bad faith, partly in terms of some necessary or singular
‘mental element,’ such as a ‘bad motive.’”73 When discretion must be
exercised according to a standard, that element should not be necessary,
as some courts have recognized. Using the expression more loosely, they
have held that a party does not act in “good faith” if he deviates from
this standard whether he was dishonest or not.
An example is Best. What mattered was that the bank charged
higher fees than it was entitled to under the standard the depositors
expected. The court said:
It is . . . not necessarily sufficient, as the Bank contends, that
the Bank acted honestly in setting its NSF fees . . . .
Undoubtedly, parties to a contract always expect that the other
party will perform the contract honestly and, where the
performance of a commercial enterprise is at issue, ordinarily
expect that it will do so in a commercially reasonable manner.

69.

739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987).

70.

Id. at 555.

71.

Id. at 559.

72.

E.g., Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for
Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been
Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 47 Hastings L.J. 585,
602, 614 (1996) (distinguishing two types of bad faith: “commercial
unreasonableness” which does not require dishonesty, and “dishonesty” or
“causing contractual injury through deceptive or disingenuous means”);
Teri J. Dobbins, Losing Faith: Extracting the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith from (Some) Contracts, 84 Or. L. Rev. 227, 270 (2005) (arguing
that “motive should be irrelevant”); Restatement (Second) of Conts.
§ 205 cmt. d (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“Subterfuges and evasions violate the
obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor believes his
conduct to be justified.”).

73.

Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition
and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810, 820 (1982).
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But the reasonable expectations of the parties need not be so
limited.74

In Best, the defendant was liable for deviating from the proper
standard intentionally but not dishonestly. A defendant may also be
liable when the deviation is not intentional but negligent. In Miller v.
Othello Packers, Inc.,75 one party was to plant and grow a crop of lima
beans, and the other was to harvest the crop and process it by freezing.76
“Payment was to be made on the basis of the tonnage and grading as
determined by the processor as the beans went through its plant.”77
The trial court found that the processor’s sampling, grading, and record
keeping was done so negligently that its figures could not be used to
determine the compensation due to the grower.78 It awarded the market
value of the crop at the time of harvesting.79 The Washington Supreme
Court, in upholding this result, said that the processor had violated the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.80
Similarly, it does not matter if a party acted dishonestly if the contract contains an “objective” condition of satisfaction, and he professes
himself dissatisfied. An “objective” condition is met if the party’s dissatisfaction is unreasonable even if it is sincere. For example, a contract
may entitle a builder to payment only if his client is satisfied that the
work was completed according to the specifications of the contract. If
the builder can prove that it was, the condition is met.81 What matters
is that the standard met was the standard on which the client’s
satisfaction was to depend.82 In contrast, a “subjective” condition of
satisfaction is not met as long as a party is genuinely dissatisfied.83 A
common example is a contract to paint a portrait in which the client
must pay only if he is satisfied. There is no standard except whether
the client likes the painting or not. If he does not, he need not pay.84

74.

739 P.2d at 558.

75.

410 P.2d 33 (Wash. 1966).

76.

Id. at 33.

77.

Id.

78.

Id. at 34.

79.

Id.

80.

See id.

81.

See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 8.4, at 520–21 (4th ed. 2004).

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.

Cf. Kohler v. Leslie Hindman, Inc., 80 F.3d 1181, 1183–84, 1187 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that where a consignment agreement permitted an auction
house to rescind an artwork’s sale in the house’s “sole discretion,” that
discretion was bound only by “good faith”).
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b. Discretion That is Not Subject to a Standard

Sometimes there is no standard or criteria by which a party’s
discretion is to be exercised. Gerhart recognized that whether a party
acts in good faith depends on whether he exercised it in accordance
with the purpose for which it was conferred on him by the contract.85
Gerhart’s example is an option, which is his second illustration of
the duty to act in good faith. In Market Street Associates v. Frey,86 the
purpose of the option was to allocate various risks concerning the future
value of property and the financing of improvements.87 Judge Posner
held correctly that the option could not be used to take advantage of
the other party’s momentary inattention to the terms of the contract.88
J.C. Penney Company had sold property to General Electric Pension
Trust, which leased it back to J.C. Penney with an option to repurchase
for twice the purchase price.89 J.C. Penney could exercise the option
only if, after it requested that the Trust consider refinancing improvements on the premises, the parties failed to reach agreement.90 J.C.
Penney assigned the lease to Market Street Associates.91 The general
partner of Market Street Associates contacted the Trust about
financing improvements on the property. 92 He did not mention the
option, and when the Trust indicated that it was not interested, he
tried to exercise it.93 According to Posner, Market Street Associates
took “deliberate advantage of an oversight by [its] contract partner
concerning [its] rights under the contract.”94 As Gerhart recognized,
what mattered was the purpose of the option. Its “function was to put
a cost on the lessor’s failure to negotiate in good faith,” not on
“remembering that the forfeiture provision was there.”95
As noted earlier, another situation in which a party is given
discretion without a standard according to which it must be exercised
is when a contract provides a “subjective” condition of satisfaction.96
As long as a party’s dissatisfaction is genuine, he has acted in good
85.

See Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 141.

86.

941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).

87.

Id. at 591.

88.

Id. at 597–98.

89.

Id. at 591–92.

90.

Id.

91.

Id. at 591.

92.

Id.

93.

Id. at 591–92.

94.

Id. at 594.

95.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 142.

96.

See Farnsworth, supra note 81, § 8.4, at 520.
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faith. Such conditions are common when the condition concerns aesthetics or business judgment. A party may agree to buy a portrait but only
if, when the portrait is painted, he is satisfied with it.97 In Mattei v.
Hopper,98 a developer agreed to buy a parcel of land for a shopping
center but only if he was satisfied with the leases that he could enter
into with third parties.99 In Western Hills v. Pfau,100 a purchaser agreed
to buy land subject to his ability “to negotiate with City of McMinnville
as to a planned development satisfactory” to both parties.101
In these cases, the standard is the party’s own satisfaction, not
whether a reasonable person would have been satisfied. Yet the standard is not whether the contract will serve his own interests. If it were,
he would have an option. He may not back out, for example, if he has
decided to patronize a different artist or found a less expensive but
equally suitable piece of land. Again, the discretion must be exercised
according to the purpose for which it is conferred by the contract.
A condition that a party must be genuinely satisfied need not be
explicit. In Locke v. Warner Brothers., Inc.,102 Warner had a right of
first refusal on Locke’s proposals for film productions and the discretion
to accept or reject them.103 The plaintiff claimed that “the development
deal was a sham, that Warner never intended to make any films with
her, and that Warner’s sole motivation in entering into the agreement”
was to do a favor for the star, Clint Eastwood, by helping him to settle
litigation with Locke.104 The court held that although Warner had the
“right to make a subjective creative decision, which is not reviewable
for reasonableness,” its “dissatisfaction [must] be bona fide or
genuine.”105 Teri Dobbins Baxter criticized the court for “read[ing] into
the contract a ‘satisfaction’ requirement that was not included in the
language of the contract itself.”106 The question, however, should have
been whether Warner used its discretion for the purpose for which it
was given. Doubtless, Locke ran the risk that her proposals would be
turned down, but the provision would have been pointless if Warner
did not need to consider them.

97.

See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.

98.

330 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1958).

99.

Id. at 625–26.

100. 508 P.2d 201 (Or. 1973).
101. Id. at 202.
102. 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Cal. App. 1997).
103. See id. at 922.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 925.
106. Dobbins, supra note 72, at 248.
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In another situation, a contract gives a party the discretion to
determine the price without prescribing a standard that he must follow
in doing so. The question again is whether this discretion was exercised
in accordance with the purpose for which it was conferred. In Wilson
v. Amerada Hess Corp.,107 Hess marketed gasoline through independent
franchise dealers and through Hess-run cooperative dealers. 108 The
prices at which it sold were to be “determined by Hess.”109 Plaintiffs,
three independent dealers, alleged “that Hess knowingly sets its . . .
prices at a level that will not allow the dealers to cover operating
expenses and achieve profit.”110 It did so, they alleged, in order to drive
out independent dealers so that Hess could replace them with its own
cooperative stations. 111 If so, Hess acted in bad faith, as the court
correctly held.112 The purpose of giving Hess discretion to determine the
price was not so that it could drive the independent dealers out of
business. They were not compensated for assuming the risk that it
would do so.
In Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin,113 the contract allowed Amoco to set
the prices and rent it charged dealer-lessees according to a formula,
which it was to devise.114 Its formula for rent charged twice for the value
of service bays.115 The court held that Amoco acted in bad faith.116 “The
dealers were justified in expecting that . . . Amoco would not charge
double for any one element of the calculation,” and “they presumably
would not have signed the agreements had they known” that it would.117
A recurring situation is a clause allowing a party to terminate a
contract at will. Again, whether a party acted in good faith depends on
whether he used that right in accordance with the purpose for which it
was conferred.

107. 773 A.2d 1121 (N.J. 2001).
108. Id. at 1124.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1125.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1132.
113. 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1995).
114. See id. at 495.
115. Id. at 496.
116. See id. at 499 (determining that evidence supported the jury’s conclusion).
117. Id.
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In an employment contract, it has been held to be bad faith for a
company to terminate a contract with an employee118 or other agent119
to avoid paying him a commission or letting him purchase stock which
he would otherwise be entitled to buy under a stock option.120 As the
Restatement (Second) of Agency provides:
An agent to whom the principal has made a revocable offer of
compensation if he accomplishes a specified result is entitled to
the promised amount if the principal, in order to avoid payment
of it, revokes the offer and thereafter the result is accomplished
as the result of the agent’s prior efforts.121

That rule is correct. In such a situation, the employer uses his
discretion to deprive a party of part of his compensation: the extra
amount he was supposed to be paid if he was successful. The employee
surely did not assume the risk that if he were successful, the employer
would exercise his discretion to take it away.
Similarly, a franchisor, licensor, or wholesale distributor cannot use
a termination clause to appropriate an increase in the value of the
business in which the other party is engaged. This principle is
sometimes applied without being acknowledged. Some courts reach the
right result but claim that they do so because of the language of the
parties’ contract. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic,122 the franchisor
refused to renew a franchise, presumably because it wished to replace
the franchisee with someone else.123 If it were able to do so, it could
appropriate the value of the franchise.124 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that it could not. 125 In Amoco Oil Co. v. Burns, 126 the
franchisor wished to terminate the franchise and sell off the property
that it had leased to the franchisee.127 It was not appropriating the
franchisee’s business, but cutting its losses.128 The same court held that

118. See Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Reg. Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257–58 (Mass.
1977) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 454 (Am. L. Inst.
1958)).
119. RLM Assocs. v. Carter Mfg. Corp., 248 N.E.2d 646, 646 (Mass. 1969).
120. Lemmon v. Cedar Point, Inc., 406 F.2d 94, 95–97 (6th Cir. 1969).
121. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 454 (Am. L. Inst. 1958).
122. 390 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1978).
123. Id. at 737–38.
124. Id. at 742.
125. Id. at 743.
126. 437 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1981).
127. Id. at 382.
128. Id.
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it could terminate.129 The reason for the difference in result, according
to the court, was that, “unlike Razumic, the right to terminate the
relationship without cause [in Burns] was reserved by the parties in
their written agreement.”130 The result should not turn on the presence
or absence of such a provision. If the contract in Razumic had expressly
allowed the franchisor to terminate the relationship without cause, the
purpose of that provision could not have been to allow it to appropriate
the value of the franchisee’s business. If the contract in Burns had
contained no such provision, termination by Amoco to cut its losses
would be consistent with good faith.
The same principle limits a landlord’s right to refuse his consent to
an assignment or sublease. The modern rule is that, in the words of the
California Supreme Court, the landlord cannot refuse without “a good
faith reasonable objection.”131 According to the Restatement (Second)
of Property:
A restraint on alienation without the consent of the landlord of
the tenant’s interest in the leased property is valid, but the
landlord’s consent to an alienation by the tenant cannot be
withheld unreasonably, unless a freely negotiated provision in the
lease gives the landlord an absolute right to withhold consent.132

As the Supreme Court of California said, to refuse consent, “in
order . . . [to] charge a higher rent than originally contracted for . . .
fail[s] the tests of good faith and reasonableness . . . .”133
Again, the question is the purpose for which the landlord was given
the right to consent. Normally, a lease is like a sale: the lessor avoids
the risk that if he waits or leases for a shorter term, the market value
of the leasehold may fall, and the lessee avoids the risk that it may rise.
If the lessee wished to move out before the end of the term, for example,
because someone else can operate a business there more profitably, he
would continue to pay the rent for which he originally contracted if the
rental value of the property had fallen. To allow the lessor to appropriate part of the increase if the value has risen would be to allow him
to renege on a bet he has lost.

129. Id. at 384.
130. Id. at 383.
131. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 842 (Cal. 1985),
(quoting Cohen v. Ratinoff, 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 330 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983)).
132. Restatement (Second) of Prop. § 15.2(2) (Am. L. Inst. 1977).
133. Kendall, 709 P.2d at 842 (quoting Schweiso v. Williams, 150 Cal. App.
3d. 883, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
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2. Promoting Cooperation

Gerhart’s examples concern situations in which the issue of good
faith arises because, to achieve flexibility, the contract confers discretion on one party. In other situations, the issue arises because the parties must cooperate in ways that cannot easily be specified in advance.
Daniel Markovits had such situations in mind when he said that
“good faith becomes particularly important” when it is “impracticable
or even impossible for the parties to regulate . . . advantage taking
directly and expressly, because prior agreements cannot effectively
reach them.”134 “For imperfect planners, who cannot plan clearly for
every contingency but whose plans inevitably involve haziness and have
gaps, good faith is required to make joint planning possible.”135
Markovits believed, however, that in these situations there is no
way to draw a line between avoiding fraud, at one end of the spectrum,
and observing a “fiduciary loyalty,” at the other.136 One cannot do so
by asking about the reasonable expectations of the parties: “good faith
is required precisely because the contractual intentions of the parties,
and hence also their reasonable expectations, are not complete or
clear.”137 Consequently, “[a]n understanding of good faith thus does not
so much help to decide cases as to understand what has been decided.”138
Here, as before, what should matter is whether a party who fails to
cooperate is imposing a risk on the other party, which that party was
not compensated to assume. He does so if his failure deprives the other
party of a benefit that induced that party to contract so long as
cooperation does not impose a burden on him that he was not compensated to bear. As Gerhart said, sometimes “contracting parties will
accept some burdens on behalf of the counterparty in order to provide
that counterparty with the rewards that the counterparty bargained
for. . . . [I]t is part of the obligation that maintains the ex ante
equilibrium . . . .”139
According to Markovits, similar considerations should guide parties
who are attempting to act in good faith. “[G]ood faith supports the
parties’ contractual settlement . . . . It is thus, fundamentally, an
attitude of respect for the contract relation, and the measure of good

134. Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contract’s Core Value, in Philosophical
Foundations of Contract Law, 272, 274 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas,
& Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
135. Id. at 293.
136. Id. at 279.
137. Id. at 278.
138. Id. at 280.
139. Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 139.
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faith is the contract itself.”140 Each party has a duty “to adjust, in good
faith, to new contingencies, in order not to deprive the other party of
the benefits that the contract was intended to secure.”141
It is true, as Markovits observed, that in these situations, deciding
whether a party acted in good faith is not like “implying terms in the
agreement.”142 One can often tell what terms the parties would have
agreed upon had they considered a problem at the time they entered
into a contract. In these situations, one cannot. The issue of good faith
arises because the parties must cooperate in ways that cannot easily be
specified in advance. It may not be possible to say what a party acting
in good faith should do. It may still be possible to see when his act or
failure to act “deprive[s] the other party of the benefits that the contract
was intended to secure.”143
a. Positive Duties of Cooperation

Sometimes cooperation requires a positive act without which the
other party’s performance cannot be made 144 or without which a
condition cannot be fulfilled.145 If an owner must empty his cabinets
before a contractor can remodel his kitchen, or if he must seek a permit
before the contractor can build on his land, then the court will imply
that he must make a good faith effort.
A good faith effort is not necessarily the same as “best efforts.” In
Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp.,146 the court held that the licensee
of the rights to a biopsy needle did not have a duty to use best efforts
to develop a market for it even though the licensor was to be paid a
percentage that depended on the success of his efforts. 147 “Especially . . . when an inventor grants a license to patented technology,
the application of which is unknown, a commitment on the part of the
licensee to devote best efforts to the development of the technology is

140. Markovits, supra note 134, at 280.
141. Id. at 291.
142. Id. at 276 (quoting E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and
Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 666, 670 (1963)).
143. Id. at 291.
144. See, e.g., Designer Direct, Inc. v. DeForest Redevelopment Auth., 313
F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing a failure take steps to make
contractor’s performance possible as a “lack of good faith”).
145. Simon v. Etgen, 107 N.E. 1066, 1067–68 (N.Y. 1915) (finding when the
sale of a building is a condition to be fulfilled before payment was due,
good faith requires sale within a reasonable time).
146. 956 F.2d 1436 (7th Cir. 1992).
147. See id. at 1437, 1442, 1145.
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a substantial commitment which should not be automatically inferred.”148 But the defendant was under a duty “to exercise reasonably
its discretion in developing and marketing the Beraha needle.”149 If, in
its “business judgment,” development of the needle was unwise, it acted
in good faith “even if it exerted no efforts at all to develop” it.150
b. Negative Duties of Cooperation

In contrast, sometimes a party’s duty to cooperate is negative
rather than positive. He must not obstruct the other party from receiving a benefit which induced that party to contract. The issue of good
faith arises because it is difficult to specify in advance all the actions
that a party should not take.
Unfortunately, many courts say that a duty to act in good faith
can only be implied from a duty or condition that is set out in the
contract. All the negative duties to cooperate cannot be set out in
advance. There is no limit to the ways in which, by failing to act, one
party could obstruct the other’s opportunity to receive a benefit that
was anticipated by both parties and induced that party to contract on
the terms that he did.
The benefits that a party anticipated and that induced him to
contract may be part of the compensation he was supposed to receive
under the contract. Or they may be additional benefits such as the
opportunity to make advantageous bargains with others. We will
discuss each situation in turn.
In Seidenberg v. Summit Bank,151 the benefits that the plaintiffs
expected were part of the compensation that they were supposed to
receive.152 In return for selling stock in two corporations to Summit
Bank, they were to retain their positions as the corporations’ executives
and “to be placed in charge of the daily operations of any other [similar]
insurance business” that Summit acquired.153 They also agreed to salary
reductions “in exchange for a bonus to which they would be entitled
based on the growth of the [corporations].”154 The plaintiffs alleged that
the Summit’s obstructive conduct showed that it “‘never had any
intention to perform to begin with,’ and that Summit ‘from the start,
. . . never [was] committed to developing the business with [plaintiffs],
but rather simply wanted to acquire the business and seek out their
148. Id. at 1442–43 (alternation in original) (quoting Permanence Corp. v.
Kennametal, Inc., 908 F.2d 98, 103 (6th Cir. 1990)).
149. Id. at 1444.
150. Id. at 1445.
151. 791 A.2d 1068 (N.J. 2002).
152. Id. at 1072.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1073.
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own broker to run it or grow it.’”155 If so, the court held, the defendant
acted in bad faith.156 In this case, the court implied the duty to act in
good faith from an express provision in the contract. The contract said:
“Summit and [plaintiffs] shall work together to formulate joint marketing programs . . . .”157
Sometimes the compensation a party is to receive depends on the
extent to which the other party uses or profits from the goods or
services he provides. In Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Central Packing
Co., 158 the rent charged for truck trailers to transport frozen food
depended on how many miles the trucks were driven.159 There was no
minimum rental and no requirement that the trailers be driven a
minimum number of miles.160 The lessee’s assignee did not use them at
all.161 The court held that he had acted in bad faith by “interfer[ing]
with the right of the other to the fruits of its bargain.”162 The court was
correct. The risk that the lessor assumed by charging by the mile was
not that the lessee would acquire a back-up fleet and pay nothing for
it.
Unfortunately, instead of simply asking what risks the parties
assumed, the court felt compelled to imply a duty of good faith from
an express clause in the lease. The lease said that the lessee would “use
and operate the motor vehicle equipment . . . in the normal and
ordinary conduct of its business.”163 That clause had nothing to do with
the non-use of the trailers—a problem that the drafters never
considered. By reading the clause as though it did, the court reached
the right result while claiming it did not “imply an additional covenant
enlarging [the] terms” of a “seemingly complete” agreement.164 This is
a dangerous line of argument. It suggests that if the lease had not
happened to mention “use,” the result would be different.
That line of argument led to the wrong result in Mutual Life
Insurance Co. of New York v. Tailored Woman, Inc.165 The plaintiff
leased its basement and first three floors fronting Fifth Avenue to the
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1078.
157. Id. at 1072.
158. 341 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1965).
159. Id. at 322.
160. Id. at 322, 325.
161. Id. at 322.
162. Id. at 323, 324.
163. Id. at 322.
164. Id. at 323, 324 (quoting Stern v. Dunlap Co., 228 F.2d 939, 942 (10th Cir.
1955)).
165. 128 N.E.2d 401 (N.Y. 1955).
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defendant, a women’s clothing store, in return for 4% of all sales made
“on, in, and from the demised premises.”166 Six years later, it leased the
defendant part of the fifth floor for a fixed rent.167 The defendant moved
its fur department, which sold its most expensive clothes, to the fifth
floor.168 The plaintiff sued a year later, when it “learned for the first
time that it was not receiving its percentage from the sales of furs.”169
The court said that it accepted “the good old rule that there is in
every contract an implied covenant of fair dealing.”170 Yet it found for
the defendant because it thought it had to tease an answer out of words
in the original lease “on, in, and from the demised premises.”171 These
words were drafted before the possibility of moving the fur department
had arisen.172 Yet the court did not ask why the defendant did so. If the
reason was not to increase sales but to lower the amount of its rent,
then it should have been held liable for violating its obligation to act in
good faith. The rent in the original lease was not increased to
compensate the lessor for the risk that the lessee would sell his most
expensive goods from a floor yet to be rented.
Sometimes, the benefit of which a party has been deprived is not
part of the compensation he was to receive under the contract. It is an
opportunity that the contract provides for him to enter into profitable
bargains with others. Because of his expectations, the other party may
have been able to contract on more favorable terms. If so, to deprive
him of this opportunity violates the duty to act in good faith.
An example is Sanders v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.173
“FedEx recruited . . . Sanders to be an independent contractor charged
with making pick-ups and deliveries along a specified route.”174 Sanders
claimed that FedEx told him “that he would have the ability to grow
his business by buying routes from other contractors as they became

166. Id. at 402 (adopting “the facts of this controversy, and the issues, [as]
discussed in the Appellate Division opinion”); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Tailored Woman, Inc., 126 N.Y.S.2d 573, 574 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953).
167. Tailored Woman, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 575. (“It was specifically provided that
the landlord should not be entitled to any percentage of receipts from
sales or services on the demised premises and that the lease should not
have any ‘effect’ on the 1939 lease of the basement and lower three
floors.”).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 575–76.
170. Tailored Women, 128 N.E.2d, at 403 (citing Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul
Armstrong Co. et. al., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933)).
171. Id. at 402–03.
172. Id. at 402.
173. 188 P.3d 1200 (N.M. 2008).
174. Id. at 1202.
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available.”175 FedEx obstructed his efforts to do so for reasons that had
nothing to do with his qualifications to operate the routes.176 The lower
court reached the wrong result by the line of reasoning just described.
“[T]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be tied to
a specific clause or term of the contract.”177 Its decision was reversed on
the grounds that the implied covenant of good faith “prohibit[s] one
party from obstructing the other party’s benefit, whether that benefit
is express or implied.”178 FedEx had charged Sanders an amount that
reflected the benefit Sanders expected from buying additional routes.179
FedEx could no more deprive him that benefit than of the amount of
money promised him in the contract.
In Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith’s Food & Drug
Centers, Inc., 180 the lessee in a shopping center frustrated the
expectations concerning the use he would make of the premises that
had led the owner to lease on the terms that it did.181 The premises
were leased for a grocery store or “any other lawful retail selling
business not directly in conflict or competition with another major
tenant.”182 The lessee opened a grocery store nearby and used the space
it had leased as a “box store” which, the shopping center claimed, “was
a ‘sham’ operation designed to improperly ‘freeze’ the space in Olympus
Hills and to force customers to its new location.” 183 The court held
correctly that this use violated the shopping center owner’s “justified
expectations.”184 The lessee’s “minimum rent was below the break-even
point for the shopping center’s operating costs” because it was the
anchor tenant at the center, generating significant customer traffic that
was necessary to the financial health and operation of the shopping
center.185
Yet ten years later, on similar facts, the same court that had
declined to grant certiorari in Olympus Hills Shopping Center reached
the opposite result. It did so by employing the line of argument we have
criticized. It tried to extract an answer from the language of a contract
that was never meant to deal with the issue. In Oakwood Village, L.L.C.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1202, 1205.
177. Id. at 1203–04.
178. Id. at 1203.
179. See id. at 1206.
180. 889 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
181. Id. at 448.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 448, 451.
184. Id. at 449, 451–52.
185. Id. at 452.

340

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 2·2021
Peter Gerhart on Good Faith

v. Albertsons, Inc.,186 a shopping center leased space to the lessee for a
supermarket and guaranteed that it would be the only supermarket in
the center.187 It expected the lessee “to function as the center’s anchor
tenant.”188 “[A]fter perceiving a better opportunity in a new shopping
center across the street, [it] . . . moved one block south to become the
anchor tenant in the Marketplace,” another shopping center.189 “After
[it] relocated, [it] ‘went dark’ at its [old] location . . . while continuing
to pay the monthly rent on the now vacant building.”190 “[Its] counsel
admitted at trial, that [it] intentionally kept the old building
unoccupied in order to restrict competition with its new store.”191 It is
hard to imagine that the shopping center assumed the risk it would do
so in return for an increase in rent. Yet the court held that the tenant
was entitled to act like a “dog in the manger.”192 The reason was that
the doctrine of good faith “cannot be read to establish new, independent
rights or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante.”193 The court
distinguished Olympus Hills Shopping Center on the grounds that there,
“the lease contained an express covenant of continuous operation and
a restriction on the nature of operations.”194 That is an odd way to
characterize a clause that said that the lessee can operate “any lawful
retail selling business not directly in conflict or competition with
another major tenant.”195 In any event, once again this line of reasoning
led to the wrong result.

II. Other Conceptions of Good Faith
Scholars have failed to agree on the meaning of good faith. Robert
Summers claimed that the phrase cannot be defined positively, but only
negatively, as what he calls an “excluder.”196 According to other schol-

186. 104 P.3d 1226 (Utah 2004).
187. Id. at 1229–30.
188. Id. at 1229.
189. Id. at 1230.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1241.
193. Id. at 1240.
194. Id. at 1241.
195. Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc.,
889 P.2d 445, 448 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
196. Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 196
(1968).
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ars, the doctrine is pernicious because it conflicts with standard methods of contract interpretation.197 Some say it is unnecessary because it
merely recapitulates them. 198 Some say that the doctrine ensures
fairness, but their conception of fairness borders on altruism.199 Some
say the doctrine promotes economic efficiency.200 They all differ from
Gerhart’s approach, but there is an element of truth in each of them.
A. Good Faith as an “Excluder”

In a seminal article, Robert Summers claimed that one cannot
define “good faith.” “[G]ood faith is an ‘excluder.’ It is a phrase without
general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a wide
range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.” 201 According to Robert
Braucher, who then served as Reporter, Summers’s approach influenced
that of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 202 The Restatement
(Second) does not define good faith. It provides: “Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.”203 According to Braucher:
[T]he trouble with this section, of course, is that it’s very general,
very abstract, and it needs specification the worst way, and
specification is not to be had. I am indebted for its formulation
here in the comments—formulations in the comments—to
Professor Summers . . . .204

He was referring primarily to comment (a): “Meanings of ‘good
faith.”
The phrase “good faith” is used in a variety of contexts, and its
meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of
conduct characterized as involving “bad faith” because they

197. See Dobbins, supra note 72, at 231.
198. See Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract
Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 St. John’s
L. Rev. 559, 563 (2006).
199. See Scott, supra note 41, at 850.
200. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 373 (1980).
201. Summers, supra note 196, at 201 (footnote omitted).
202. Friday Afternoon Session May 22, 1970, 47 A.L.I. Proc. 489–90
[hereinafter 47 A.L.I. Proc.].
203. Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 205 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
204. 47 A.L.I. Proc., supra note 202, at 490.
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violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. The appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good
faith also varies with the circumstances.205

The comment neither refers to “good faith” as an excluder, nor says
that a definition is impossible. Nevertheless, it does not provide the
“specification” which, according to Braucher, the section “needs . . . [in]
the worst way.” 206 The reason, presumably, is that it “is not to be
had.”207
The term “good faith” has indeed been used in heterogenous
situations. It does not follow that the term cannot be defined but rather
that one definition will not fit all of them. In a follow-up article,
Summers enumerated these situations. They concern issues of
consideration (“conjuring up a pretended dispute in order . . . to lay a
basis for a settlement”), the fairness of the modification of the terms of
a contract (“taking advantage of another’s necessitous circumstances to
secure a favorable modification”), the general problem of how to
interpret the language of a contract (“asserting an overreaching or
‘weaseling’ interpretation or construction of contract language”), and
problems of conditions and remedies (“wilful rendering of only
substantial performance”; “making harassing demands for assurances of
performance; wrongfully refusing to accept performance; and wilfully
failing to mitigate damages”208). In each of those contexts, “good faith”
does have a different meaning. But that does not show its meaning
cannot be defined in the situations we have discussed in which a duty
of good faith is needed to provide flexibility or to ensure cooperation.209
Some of those situations are mentioned obliquely in Summers’s
enumeration. A contract gives a party “a power to determine compliance or to terminate a contract” and thereby provide flexibility. 210
“[I]nterference with, or failure to cooperate in, the other party’s performance” may constitute bad faith, as may “lack of diligence and slacking
off.”211
Summers also observed that bad faith also means “evasion of the
spirit of the deal.”212 That idea sounds like a vague expression of the
principle we have seen to be at stake in all the situations that we have

205. Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 205 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
206. 47 A.L.I. Proc., supra note 202, at 490.
207. Id.
208. Summers, supra note 73, at 813.
209. See supra Part I(B)(1).
210. Summers, supra note 73, at 812–13.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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discussed. Summers identified it with what Burton called the “recapture” of “forgone opportunities,”213 an idea that we will discuss next.
Summers claimed that Burton’s formulation was no more precise than
his own. 214 We have tried to show how the principle that we have
suggested can be given precision. Be that as it may, if one can explain
the meaning of “the spirit of the deal,” one can explain the meaning of
good faith.215 The term is not merely an “excluder.”
Summers’s idea that some terms function as “excluders” is one way
of reacting against the conceptualism of the 19th-century jurist.216 They
defined concepts without regard to purposes and have rightly been
criticized for ignoring the purposes that the law serves. 217 In our
account, the duty to act in good faith was explained in terms of the
purposes of providing for flexibility and promoting cooperation. 218
Summers lists six “different methods of conceptualization,” one of
which is by using an “excluder.”219 None of them define a concept in
terms of its purposes.
The first is typical of 19th-century conceptualism: “1. Conceptualization by formal definition—e.g., resort to necessary and sufficient
conditions for the use of a word or phrase.”220
The element of truth in Summers’s approach is that legal concepts
cannot be defined in this way. If they could, the dream of the 19thcentury jurists could be realized. When a new case arose, one would
simply ask whether the necessary and sufficient conditions for using a
term have been satisfied.
Such definitions ignore the purposes that the law serves. What
human beings make or do must be defined in terms of its purposes, but
the definition will not contain a set of “necessary and sufficient
conditions for the use of a word or phrase.”221 The purpose of a chair is
for a person to sit on it; the purpose of swimming is to move one’s body
forward through the water. By defining objects or activities such as
these in terms of their purposes, one can explain why any chair or any
swimming stroke has the features that it does. The definition can even
suggest the features that a chair or stroke might have to perform its
purpose better. But it does not identify necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to be a chair or an activity to be swimming. The
213. Id. at 830.
214. Id. at 833.
215. Id. at 812–13; see supra Part I.
216. Id. at 818–19.
217. James Gordley, The Jurists: A Critical History 276–77 (2013).
218. See supra Part I(B).
219. Summers, supra note 73, at 817–18.
220. Id. at 817.
221. Id.
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same is true of legal terms and institutions. Defining good faith in terms
of the purposes of providing flexibility or ensuring cooperation does not
produce a list of conditions that must be met before we can say that a
person has acted in good faith. But it does explain how those purposes
may be served.
Summers’s next four methods are attempts to define a term without
providing a formal definition:
2. Conceptualization by synonymous paraphrase of the word or
phrase in question (including contrastive paraphrase).
3. Conceptualization by paradigmatic sample, specifying what is
required for the use of the word or phrase.
4. Conceptualization mainly by recital or representative examples
illustrating the application of the word or phrase.
5. Conceptualization by specification of family resemblances that
run through diverse uses of the word or phrase.222

As Summers recognized, none of these methods can provide an
adequate, usable definition of good faith. To explain one term by a
paraphrase or synonym (method 2) sidesteps the question of how to
define the synonym or the terms used in the paraphrase. To explain a
term by a paradigm (method 3) or representative examples (method 4)
sidesteps the question of what makes the paradigm paradigmatic or the
examples representative. 223 The idea of using family resemblances
(method 5), as Summers recognized, was borrowed from
Wittgenstein. 224 Wittgenstein’s illustration, as explained by Lon L.
Fuller, was the term “game.” If a parent asked a babysitter to teach his
children a game, and the babysitter taught them to duel with kitchen
knives, the parent would say, “That’s not the kind of game I meant.”
The example is supposed to show that one can only explain what a
game is in terms of resemblances between different instances of what
we call games. 225 What it actually shows is that words should be
understood in terms of their purposes. The parents used the term
“game” with one purpose in mind: to provide diversion for their
children. Where the purpose is different, as in athletic competitions or
games of chance, what counts as a “game” will be different.
Since these five methods are inadequate to define good faith,
Summers concluded that one must use a sixth: “6. Conceptualization
by way of ‘excluder analysis.’”226

222. Id. at 818.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 818 (citing Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1958)).
225. Lon L. Fuller, The Concept of Law 138–39 (rev. ed. 1969).
226. Summers, supra note 73, at 818.
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He took this idea from John Austin227 and applied it to a much
different problem. Austin was trying to solve the problem of Cartesian
doubt: how do I know that everything I take to be real is not an
hallucination or a dream?228 Austin’s answer was that the word “real”
is an excluder: it is defined as that which is not real such as a dream or
an hallucination.229 The Aristotelian view, challenged by the philosophy
of Descartes, was the opposite: reality is a first principle of human
reason—what it grasps before it grasps anything else—and dreams or
hallucinations are defined by the fact that they are not real.230
Be that as it may, Austin’s approach is helpful if one knows what
is being “excluded.” If one knows what a dream or a hallucination is,
one can say, “reality is not that.” For the term “good faith” to function
as an excluder, one would have to know what is meant by “bad faith.”
But how is one to know? Perhaps in the way that the Restatement
(Second) suggests: “‘bad faith’ . . . violate[s] community standards of
decency, fairness or reasonableness.”231 But if so, why say that good
faith” is an excluder? Why not define it as conformity to “community
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness”? If that definition is
too vague to mean anything, then how is one to know what “bad faith”
means? Summers illustrates the meaning of bad faith by giving a series
of examples and claiming that no definition of good faith can explain
them all. But that would seem to be “conceptualization” by
representative examples, a method, he said, which cannot be used to
understand the meaning of “good faith.”232 Why, then, can it be used
to understand “bad faith”?
B. The Good Faith as a Violation of Fundamental Principles of
Interpretation

According to Teri Dobbins Baxter, “the parties’ agreement should
take precedence over the parties’ expectations, to the extent that the
two do not coincide.” 233 The “parties may not share the same
expectations and one party may be ignorant of the expectations of the
other.”234 She concluded that, “in many contracts, the implied covenant

227. J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia 70–71 (G.J. Warnock ed., 1962),
quoted in Summers, supra note 73, at 819.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 205 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
232. Summers, supra note 73, at 818.
233. Dobbins, supra note 72, at 231.
234. Id. at 232.
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of good faith is not capable or worthy of being saved from the chaos
that currently surrounds it.”235
The element of truth is that the duties to which the parties are held
should be based on their expectations. The confusion is to use the term
“expectations” too loosely. The parties’ agreement is based on their
expectations concerning the performances that each will receive and the
risks and burdens that each will bear. Their agreement should be
interpreted in terms of these expectations. Only these expectations
matter. As long as a party was compensated for bearing a risk, it does
not matter that he expected to win. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the
risks that each party was assigned by the contract extend beyond those
that either party had consciously in mind. These risks are not
extraneous to the agreement. Consequently, they are not extraneous to
the parties’ “expectations” if we use that term in the same way as when
we say a party who buys a car expects to get the car keys. He may not
have consciously thought of the keys, but it is the most appropriate
means to the end that both parties wished to achieve.
C. Good Faith as a Recapitulation of Fundamental Principles of
Interpretation

In contrast, Jay Feinman argued that “[g]ood faith is simply
another embodiment of the basic principle of contract law—the
protection of reasonable expectations.”236 Similarly, according to Harold
Dubroff, the difficulties of “defin[ing] good faith . . . would be
eliminated if cases that are really about contract interpretation were
approached that way without regard to the issue of good faith.” 237
Contracts should be interpreted in accordance with “the actual
intentions and expectations of the parties, although they may have been
expressed imperfectly.”238
The element of truth in this approach is that the doctrine of good
faith, as we have seen, is based on the same principles as those that
that explain why other terms are read into a contract to govern
situations that the parties did not anticipate. As we have seen, however,
the doctrine applies when the parties could not have provided a term
to resolve an issue in advance. If one cannot say in advance what a
party should or should not do, one might give one of the parties the
discretion to decide later on. It is impossible to list in advance all the
ways in which one party might prevent the other from obtaining a
benefit that he was supposed to receive under the contract. One must
interpret the contract to protect the parties’ reasonable expectations.
235. Id. at 230.
236. Jay M. Feinman, Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations, 67 Ark. L.
Rev. 525, 526 (2014).
237. Dubroff, supra note 198, at 563.
238. Id. at 569.
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Here, however, the only way to describe their expectations is that each
of them would act in good faith. One cannot dispense with that term
and explain what their expectations are.
D. Good Faith as Altruism

Another approach, as described by Robert Scott, is for a court to
fill in the “right” result or the “right relational” result by
imposing an equitable adjustment that takes all of the relational
and contextual factors into account as they appear at the time of
adjudication. . . . There is simply a “gap in the agreement or risk
allocation” that a court can fill based upon information available
to it at the time of adjudication. In sum, courts should fill such
gaps by creating contract terms that are fair ex post.239

According to Scott, “[t]his has been the solution most frequently suggested by the law-and-society branch of relational contract scholars.”240
He cited the work of Ian Macneil and Richard Speidel.241
Macneil developed a “relational theory” of contract law. “[E]very
transaction is embedded in complex relations. . . . [E]ffective analysis
of any transaction requires recognition and consideration of all essential
elements of its enveloping relations that might affect the transaction
significantly.”242 These relations are fluid. One cannot determine the
parties’ obligations by asking about their intentions, real or hypothetical, at the time that they contracted. As Eric Posner said, by this
approach “the parties . . . cannot expect the court to enforce contractual obligations on the basis of the initial contract, given that the initial
contract will most likely have nothing to say about events occurring
many years later.”243
Certainly, every contract, like every crime, tort, corporation, and
the exercise of any private right is embedded in a set of circumstances,
including relationships with others, without which it cannot be fully
understood. It is hard to turn this insight into a theory. Macneil himself
said: “Upon starting down th[is] road . . . it did not occur to me
239. Scott, supra note 41, at 850–51 (footnote omitted) (quoting Richard E.
Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & Com. 193, 207 (1982)).
240. Id. at 850.
241. Id. at 850 n.6 (citing Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978); id. at 851 & nn.8–9 (first
citing Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under LongTerm Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 369 (1981), and then citing
Speidel, supra note 239).
242. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94
Nw. U. L. Rev. 877, 881 (2000).
243. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical
Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 749, 751 (2000).
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consciously that I might be developing a theory. Rather, I was simply
exploring and trying to make sense of reality, the reality of what people
are actually doing in the real-life world of exchange.”244
What, then, are the legal implications of understanding “what
people are actually doing in the real-life world of exchange?” Macneil
admonished those who look for such implications: “I challenge to a duel
anyone who, after this notice, persists in converting my descriptions of
relational contract law into prescriptions of what the law should be,
particularly prescriptions of some universal application of relational
contract law.”245
According to Speidel, the implications are that the doctrine of good
faith should be given much greater scope.246 He commended a provision
of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
dealing with the problem of impracticability due to changed
circumstances.247 It provides that one party can require the other to
negotiate, and, if negotiations break down, the court should “adapt the
contract.” 248 Speidel suggested that American courts expand the
doctrine of good faith to impose a similar requirement when an issue
was not resolved when the parties contracted. 249 The contract’s
negotiations, however, would be based on the parties’ expectations of
how a court would “adapt the contract” if negotiations broke down.250
Speidel is no clearer than Macneil about how a court should do so.
Charles Goetz and Robert Scott explained that, ex ante, “[i]f the
basic risk allocation provided by a legal rule fails to suit the purposes
of particular parties, then bargainers are free to negotiate an alternative
allocation of risks.”251 Nevertheless, in “relational” contracts, “[w]here
the future contingencies are peculiarly intricate or uncertain, practical
difficulties arise that impede the contracting parties’ efforts to allocate
244. Macneil, supra note 242, at 879 (emphasis omitted).
245. Id. at 899. He qualified that remark. “Notwithstanding the challenge just
offered, in my work I have gone beyond observation and included two
types of prescription respecting relational contract law . . . . One is
entirely personal to my perceptions of the good life.” Id. at 900. It
concerned “excessive bureaucratization of modern life.” Id. at 900 n.81.
The other “is a general idea that relational contract law should generally
track the relational behavior and norms found in the relations to which it
applies.” Id. at 900.
246. Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational
Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 823, 840–41 (2000).
247. Id. at 842–43.
248. UNIDROIT Principles of Int’l Com. Conts. art. 6.2.3 (UNIDROIT
Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Priv. L. 2016).
249. Speidel, supra note 246, at 840–41, 843.
250. Id. at 839, 842 & n.71.
251. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1090 (1981).
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optimally all risks at the time of contracting.”252 The question again
arises of what a court should do then.
Since, by hypothesis, the court cannot look to the way the parties
allocated the risks at the time of contracting, it must look to what
seems be fair ex post. The implication is that courts would be
empowered to do what is fair with no standard of what fairness entails.
Perhaps the implication is that there should be no winners or losers, or,
at least, that no one should be hurt too badly. Teri Dobbins Baxter
objected that if the court imposes “a result that the court believes to
be fair . . . , the implied covenant of good faith makes every party a
guarantor of the other party’s satisfaction with the outcome of the
bargain.” 253 Scott said that the consequences to one party will be
deemed to be unfair if they are severe.254
The fear that courts will do so has haunted discussions of the
doctrine of good faith. Robert Braucher, who served as Reporter for the
Restatement (Second), said of the section on good faith: “I have been
asked about [this] Section . . . : Isn’t this an attempt . . . to write the
Sermon on the Mount into the Restatement of Contracts?”255
As Judge Posner observed, “even after you have signed a contract,
you are not obliged to become an altruist toward the other party and
relax the terms if he gets into trouble in performing his side of the
bargain.”256 That point was made in another Seventh Circuit opinion in
Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting.257 The lower
court held that a bank had “behaved inequitably in terminating [a] line
of credit.”258 It “was fully aware of the Debtor’s plight, and its reliance
upon the line of credit, and disregarded the consequences for the Debtor
and its creditors.”259 The Seventh Circuit reversed. “Debtor and Bank
signed a contract expressly allowing the Bank to cease making further
advances.”260 “Although Bank’s decision left Debtor scratching for other
sources of credit, Bank did not create Debtor’s need for funds . . . .”261
“‘Good faith’ is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to

252. Id. at 1090–91.
253. Dobbins, supra note 72, at 236–37.
254. Scott, supra note 41, at 858.
255. 47 A.L.I. Proc., supra note 202, at 488–89.
256. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991).
257. 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990).
258. Id. at 1354.
259. Id. at 1356.
260. Id. at 1357.
261. Id. at 1358.
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take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time of drafting . . . .”262 It “does not imply a general
duty of ‘kindness’ in performance . . . .”263
Similarly, in Martin v. Hamilton State Bank,264 a bank loaned the
defendant more than $2.7 million.265 When he failed to make several
payments, the bank sued to recover the loan.266 The defendant claimed
that the bank had not acted in good faith because the parties were
unable to agree on a plan by which “the indebtedness might be
restructured.” 267 The court held that it had not acted improperly,
whatever its motivation might have been.268 It had loaned the money
and was entitled to be repaid.269
The element of truth in this approach is that it recognizes the
critical role of fairness in explaining good faith. But fairness does not
mean reaching a result ex post that commends itself to both of the
parties. Fairness means reaching a result ex post that corresponds to
how risks were assigned by the parties ex ante.
E. Good Faith as Means of Promoting an Efficient Result

The element of truth in the approach of those who explain the
doctrine of good faith in terms of efficiency is that they recognize the
importance of how risks were assigned ex ante. According to Steven
Burton, “[b]ad faith performance occurs precisely when discretion is
used to recapture opportunities forgone upon contracting — when the
discretion-exercising party refuses to pay the expected cost of performance.”270
Dubroff objected that any breach of contract is an attempt to
recapture foregone opportunities:
Clearly, parties who enter into contracts forgo their opportunities
to act in specified and unspecified ways. The very nature of a
bilateral contract is to create obligations in exchange for rights.
Thus, if I promise to cut my neighbor’s lawn in exchange for her

262. Id. at 1357.
263. Id.
264. 723 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
265. Id. at 727.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 728.
269. Id.
270. Burton, supra note 200, at 373.
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promise to pay me $10, I have forgone the opportunities that
might have been available to me by not cutting her lawn.271

Certainly. The difference is that, most often, one can determine
whether a breach has occurred without considering what opportunities
were foregone. If I promise to cut my neighbor’s lawn for $10, the
neighbor gives up her chance of getting it cut for less, and I give up my
chance of using my time to cut someone else’s lawn for more. In the
first section, we saw that such a contract should be enforced because
parties have given up these opportunities in order to avoid contracting
with someone else on worse terms.272 But one can determine whether
there has been a breach of contract by asking whether I cut the lawn
and whether she paid me $10. Sometimes, one has to ask what
opportunities were foregone in order to determine whether there was a
breach of contract. In those cases, courts speak of “good faith.”
The element of truth in Burton’s approach is that it is a violation
of good faith to try to recapture a foregone opportunity. The key
difference between Gerhart’s and my approach and his is that, like
others committed to economic analysis, he tried to explain good faith
in terms of efficiency, not fairness. According to Burton, requiring a
party to act in good faith:
enhance[s] economic efficiency by reducing the costs of
contracting. The costs of exchange include the costs of gathering
information with which to choose one’s contract partners,
negotiating and drafting contracts, and risk taking with respect
to the future. The good faith performance doctrine reduces all
three kinds of costs by allowing parties to rely on the law in place
of incurring some of these costs.273

In Market Street Associates v. Frey, Judge Posner, citing Burton,
took the same approach.274
The office of the doctrine of good faith is to forbid the kinds of
opportunistic behavior that a mutually dependent, cooperative
relationship might enable in the absence of rule. “‘Good faith’ is
a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take
opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been
contemplated at the time of drafting, and which therefore was not
resolved explicitly by the parties.”

271. Dubroff, supra note 198, at 605.
272. See supra text accompanying note 50.
273. Burton, supra note 200, at 393 (footnote omitted).
274. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594–96 (7th Cir.
1991) (citing Burton, supra note 200, at 393, 372 n.17).
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. . ..
[T]he overriding purpose of contract law . . . is to give the parties
what they would have stipulated for expressly if at the time of
making the contract they had had complete knowledge of the
future and the costs of negotiating and adding provisions to the
contract had been zero.275

Posner, like Burton, did not say that taking opportunistic advantage is unfair. He said:
Such taking advantage . . . [l]ike theft, . . . has no social
product, and also like theft it induces costly defensive
expenditures, in the form of overelaborate disclaimers or
investigations into the trustworthiness of a prospective contract
partner, just as the prospect of theft induces expenditures on
locks.276

Economic analysis is concerned with what is efficient, not what is
fair. A transaction is efficient if at least one party is better off and no
one is worse off. Theft does not make both parties better off. In this
sense it “has no social product.” Transaction costs that are avoidable
are inefficient since one or both parties would be better off without
them. Theft is inefficient because “the prospect of theft induces
expenditures on locks.” Taking opportunistic advantage is inefficient
because “it induces costly defensive expenditures, in the form of
overelaborate disclaimers or investigations into the trustworthiness of
a prospective contract partner.” It increases “the costs of gathering
information with which to choose one’s contract partners, negotiating
and drafting contracts.”
Is that all? Suppose a party took opportunistic advantage in a way
that was so unanticipated that it would not increase these costs? Can
it really be that the reason a party should be prevented from acting in
bad faith is to prevent others from overinvesting in defensive measures?
As Posner suggested, it is like asking why the law condemns theft. Most
people would say it is unjust to steal just as it is unjust to take
opportunistic advantage of another contracting party. I suspect that
only a disciple of economic analysis would think the real problem is to
optimize money spent on locks or on negotiating and drafting.
It is a particularly poor explanation of the duty to act in good faith.
As we have seen, this duty is implied in situations in which an appropriate term could not be supplied in advance if drafting a contract were
costless. If discretion is conferred on a party to make the terms of a
contract more flexible, it is impossible to specify in advance how that
275. Id. at 595–96 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc.
v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990)).
276. Id. at 594.
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discretion should be used. It is impossible to specify everything that
each party must do or refrain from doing for the other to obtain the
benefit for which he contracted, then a drafter could never succeed in
doing so. The reason for implying a duty to act in good faith cannot be
to save future parties the time, cost, and error inherent in negotiating
contract terms and reducing them to writing.

Conclusion: Good Faith and Fair Exchange
We have seen why a violation of the duty to act in good faith is an
injustice. It is unfair to impose a risk or burden on the other party that
he was not compensated for bearing. As Peter Gerhart said, a party
acts in good faith when he does not upset the “equilibrium” of the
contract. 277 Hao Jiang and I have shown that this principle runs
throughout contract law.278 It was all but forgotten in the 19th century
when jurists defined contract in terms of the will of the parties and
identified their will with the terms on which they had expressly agreed.
Gerhart is to be congratulated for pointing the way back.

277. Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 2, at 137.
278. See generally Gordley & Jiang, supra note 8.
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